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Abstract
The paper empirically studies the labor market outcomes of ﬁscal austerity measures in a number of Euro-
pean countries. Cuts to government investment unambiguously raise the unemployment rate and the effect
is persistent. The consequences of negative government consumption shocks are more uncertain and we
cannot rule out that the unemployment rate falls in some countries. The participation rate increases in core
European countries, but decreases in peripheral ones, suggesting that the effects of austerity may be more
depressing in more subsidized economies. Responses of hours are always smaller than those along the ex-
tensive margin. If a sustained ﬁscal contraction is followed by a reversal the losses in terms of reduced
unemployment are modest.
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The last few years have witnessed an unprecedented use of ﬁscal policy tools in advanced economies.
Fiscal measures were taken in an attempt to cushion the severity of the downturn and boost private demand
soon after the onset of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, as central banks quickly hit the zero lower bound, responding
to the collapse of houses and assets prices, and the credit channel was impaired by a dysfunctional bank-
ing sector. According to estimates from the OECD (OECD 2009), the United States deployed the largest
ﬁscal package, with an implied cumulated budget impact over the period 2008-2010 of about 5 1⁄2 percent
of domestic output expressed at 2008 prices. In Europe, the size of ﬁscal interventions was smaller and,
for the most part, these went through automatic stabilization mechanism rather than discretionary measures.
Nonetheless, the implied adjustment in the volume of revenues and in spending plans represented a sizable
portion of domestic output for historical standards in most Member States. Since 2010, stimulus policies
were considerably reduced and eventually replaced by ﬁscal consolidation programs. These were aimed at
breaking the negative spiral of skyrocketing government deﬁcits and ballooning public debts that resulted
from the fall in tax revenues and the increase in expenditures. Austerity measures were therefore put into ac-
tion in several countries, under the close supervision of European partners with sounder public ﬁnances and
larger trade surpluses, with the twin goal of restoring conﬁdence in the euro area and setting its economies
back on a long term growth path. These events revived attention, both in policy circles and academia, about
the consequences of ﬁscal policy, its interplay with the state of the economy, the monetary policy stance, the
level of debt and credit conditions (see Blanchard and Leigh 2013; Corsetti et al. 2013; Guajardo et al.
2013; Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Christiano et al 2011; Nickel and Tudyka 2013; Ferraresi et al.
2013).
While most of the research undertaken so far investigates the link between ﬁscal policy and output
growth, less attention has been paid to studying the labour market outcomes of ﬁscal interventions. This is
in contrast with the relevance that labour market indicators have in the policymaking process and it is at odds
with the dramatic proportions that the unemployment problem has reached in several European countries,
like Greece with 26.8% unemployment rate, Spain 26.9% and Portugal 17.6% in May 2013.
In principle, unemployment multipliers can be backed out from the output ones using Okun’s law. This
procedure, however, overlooks time variations in the parameters of this relationship, does not account for
developments in the labour markets, and ignores that Okun’s law assumes causality going from unemploy-
ment to output growth, not the other way around.
If output multipliers give an idea of the possible beneﬁts, or costs, for the economy in the aggregate, un-
employment multipliers provide a more accurate picture of the repercussions that ﬁscal interventions entail
for the living standards of households. While these are important on their own, they also have relevant eco-
nomic consequences given that prolonged or pervasive unemployment episodes destroy human capital, are
more likely to determine tensions and turmoils as social conditions worsen and social ties deteriorates (Voth
and Ponticelli 2012), and the associated income shortfalls are strong predictors of households mortgage
defaults (Gerardi et al. 2013). Such phenomena can hardly be accounted for by conventional measures of
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they disrupt existing capital and know-how, lower the appetite of foreign investors for the country’s assets
and initiate second round negative effects on ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Since producing reliable output gap measures has often proved challenging, policymakers also use labour
market indicators to get insights about the state of the economy, as compared to its potential. Recently, both
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England moved further in this direction by ﬁxing an explicit threshold
that the unemployment rate must reach in order to activate a reduction of the monetary stimulus. Actions
of this sort make a strong case for improving our understanding of the extent to which ﬁscal policy affects
the target variable and, as a result, the speed at which the economy converges to - or is held away from -
the given threshold. This task is especially needed at times when automatic stabilization mechanisms have
left room to discretionary ﬁscal policies and coordination between the monetary and ﬁscal policy fronts is
advocated at the highest policy levels (Lagarde 2013).
Consistently with the priorities set above, the scope of this paper is primarily descriptive and its main
contribution is to provide an empirical characterization of the relationship between government spending
and the unemployment rate for Europe as a whole and for several European countries individually. We
consider a balanced set of peripheral - Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece - and core - France, Germany,
Netherlands and Austria - Member States. We estimate a panel Bayesian random coefﬁcient VAR model
featuring ﬁscal, real and monetary variables. The panel structure is advantageous as it allows to compute an
average, or typical, response while retaining information on individual country results.
The paper considers several questions concerning the connection between ﬁscal policy and the labour mar-
kets. Does austerity increase the unemployment rate? For how long? Are the effects of different ﬁscal
instruments, like government consumption and investment, alike? Are they similar across countries and
over time? Are there allocative effects of government spending across sectors of the economy? Do credible
commitments to reverse the ﬁscal intervention make the latter more or less effective in terms of its labour
market outcomes?
Our results show that contractionary government spending shocks raise the unemployment rate in the av-
erage European state, the multiplier on impact is around one, but cross-country heterogeneity is remarkable.
There appears to be two major differences between government consumption and investment shocks relative
to the implied dynamics of the unemployment rate. Government consumption shocks determine responses
characterized by large conﬁdence bands, so that one cannot rule out that cuts to government consumption
have beneﬁcial effects on unemployment in some countries. Instead, government investment shocks un-
ambiguously raise the unemployment rate and they have effects that are usually more persistent than those
stemming from government consumption shocks, implying that the cumulated unemployment multipliers
can differ substantially.
The channels of transmission of the shocks are also of interest. When a negative government consumption
shock hits, the participation rate increases in Germany, Austria and Netherlands. This is in contrast to what
we observe in Greece, Italy, Spain and in the average country where the participation rate declines, indicat-
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that cuts to government consumption are more depressing in economies with more rigid labour markets,like
the peripheral Member States. The participation rate increases after a government investment shock, which
suggests that displaced workers do not leave the labour force and actively seek for jobs. This mechanism
can partly offset the increase in the unemployment rate and mitigate the negative consequences on the em-
ployment to population ratio.
The extensive margin seems to be the preferred channel of adjustment of European labour markets to
ﬁscal innovations: the responses of hours per employee are small or not signiﬁcant. Because government
spending is usually concentrated in a subset of industries, we also study the allocative effects across sectors
of the economy. We ﬁnd that the aggregate results hide sectoral differences in the responses of the employ-
ment rate to government investment shocks only. In particular, the effects of the shock die out more quickly
in the manufacturing, industry and public sectors; instead the dynamics tend to be more persistent in the
construction sector. Sectoral heterogeneities are more common in core European countries, Italy being the
only peripheral country showing signiﬁcant variations in the dynamics across sectors.
Finally, if the initial ﬁscal contraction is followed by a reversal, the losses in terms of reduced unemploy-
ment are modest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets our work in the literature. Section 3 de-
scribes the model and the estimation techniques. Section 4 outlines the data used and motivates the choice
of the endogenous series included in the model. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Sections 6
concludes.
2 Literature
The closest works to ours are Pappa (2009), Bruckner and Pappa (2010) and Bermperoglou et al.
(2013). These papers adopt a multi-country approach and present stylized facts on the responses of labour
market variables to ﬁscal shocks using VAR methods. Pappa (2009) studies the dynamics of the real wage
and employment in the US, both at the federal and at the state level, after either a government consumption,
government investment or a government employment shock. Bermperoglou et al. (2013) consider also
shocks to government wages in a group of countries including the US, UK, Japan and Canada and ﬁnd
that cuts in the government wage bill can be expansionary and reduce unemployment, while other types
of shocks are typically associated with output losses and increases in unemployment. Bruckner and Pappa
(2010) examine the effects of government expenditure shocks on labour market variables in a sample of
OECD countries and show that ﬁscal expansions can lead to signiﬁcant increases in the unemployment
rate. In comparison to this literature, we also ﬁnd that shocks to different government spending tools have
qualitatively and quantitatively different effects on the unemployment rate. Cuts to government investment
always imply an increase in the unemployment rate. However, in the case of government consumption
shocks, the conﬁdence bands are large and we cannot rule out that negative shocks reduce the unemployment
3rate. In fact, there are two cases, Austria and Netherlands, where the median response remains always below
zero, although not signiﬁcantly so.
Other authors adopt VAR methods to identify the determinants of ﬂuctuations in the unemployment rate in
individual countries, such as Dolado and Jimeno (1997) for Spain, Gambetti and Pistoresi (2004) for Italy
and Alexius and Holmlund (2007) for Sweden. Their focus is broader compared to ours, that is instead
speciﬁc to ﬁscal policy. However, an interesting commonality emerges: several of these papers emphasize
the hysteretic behaviour of the unemployment rate in response to shocks, a ﬁnding that is consistent with
the very persistent dynamics that we observe in our data.
Our work is also related to those investigating the size of the output multiplier of government spending
shocks. As the size of the multiplier is country-, time- and state-dependent, the literature does not agree on
an exact value. However, most estimates coming from different models fall in the range from 0.3 to 1. In
this respect, our work brings new evidence that ﬁscal multipliers in several Member States are below unity,
although there is considerable variation across countries. New and perhaps against common wisdom is the
ﬁnding that output multipliers from government consumption shocks are larger than those from government
investment shocks. The more negative drag determined by the former kind of shock is a consequence
of the strong comovement of both government investment and social beneﬁts conditional on a government
consumptionshock. Infact, cutsingovernmentconsumptioninitiatebigdropsinspendingininvestmentand
social beneﬁts, while reductions in government investment determine a negative but much milder reaction
of government spending for consumption and social beneﬁts. The synchronization between spending in
consumption and social beneﬁts can be especially important when the latter represents a relevant portion of
the government balance sheet, as is indeed the case in all European countries we consider.
3 The methodology
The core evidence of the paper is obtained using a hierarchical panel VAR model. The choice is mo-
tivated by several considerations. Firstly, since the time dimension of European data is not long, VAR
coefﬁcients are imprecisely estimated. Secondly, the countries in our sample are likely to be characterized
by considerable cyclical heterogeneity as they include Member States from both the north and the south of
Europe, some of them notoriously lead the European economic cycle while others lag, and their national
account ﬁgures differ remarkably. While the ﬁrst argument raises doubts about the opportunity of running
single-country VAR models using OLS, the latter indicates that it is not a good idea to estimate a pooled
VAR for the eight countries either.
In our exercises we use a multi-country random coefﬁcient Bayesian VAR model. The distinctive feature of
such model is that it allows to efﬁciently combine unit-speciﬁc and cross sectional information by assuming
that country-speciﬁc dynamic coefﬁcients are realizations from the same underlying data generating pro-
cess. In other words, the dynamics of transmission of the shocks are potentially different across countries,
but the distribution from which they come from has a common mean. The ﬁrst point allows to estimate the
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by setting an average prior for the individual country results that summarizes cross-country information.
Multi-country random coefﬁcient Bayesian VAR models have been used in Canova (2005), Ciccarelli
and Rebucci (2006), Canova and Pappa (2007), Jarocinski (2010). For each country, the VAR model is:
yn;t = B0
nyn;t 1 +  0
nzt + un;t (1)
where n = 1;2;:::;N denotes countries; t = 1;2;:::;Tn time and Tn varies with the country; yn;t is an
M  1 vector of endogenous variables; zn;t collects deterministic components; un;t are VAR innovations;
Bn and  n are matrices containing the slopes and the intercept coefﬁcients. Rewrite (1) as:
Yn = XnBn + Zn n + Un (2)
where Xn is the matrix obtained by stacking vertically the Tn observations in y0
n;t 1. Thus Yn and Un are
Tn  M; Xn is Tn  M; Zn is Tn  Q; Bn is K  M;  n is Q  M. Let yn  vec(Yn), n  vec(Bn)
and n  vec( n). We assume that the slope coefﬁcients satisfy:
p(nj ;;On) = N( ;  In) (3)
where   is the common mean and   In is the dispersion,  being the parameter that controls the general
tightness of the restriction. We initially tried to be agnostic about how much the country-speciﬁc coefﬁcients
differ from the common mean and imposed a diffuse prior on the parameter. However, such a choice resulted
in fairly large estimates of  and, in turn, in systematic violations of the stability test for the VAR coefﬁcients
 . This may be caused by a lack of sufﬁcient information in our sample to precisely estimate this parameter.
Therefore, its value is treated as ﬁxed.
The VAR innovations are i.i.d. N(0;n) and the prior on their covariance matrix is diffuse, i.e.:
p(n) / jnj  1
2(N+1) (4)
The priors for the coefﬁcients on the deterministic variables and for the common mean are also diffuse:
p(n) / 1 (5)
p( ) / 1 (6)
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likelihood which, for the stacked vector of countries, is:
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Since the priors are conjugate, the conditional posterior densities are analytically available and this enables
us to numerical compute the joint posterior distributions with the Gibbs sampler. The joint posterior for the
unknowns is:
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Let   [n; n; n;  ] and denote by = the vector of  excluding the coefﬁcient . The conditional
posterior of n is:
p(njY;=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n; ~ n) (9)
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The conditional posterior of 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The conditional posterior of  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By iteratively sampling from (9)-(12), one obtains a sequence for  that can be used for inference. The
ﬁrst 300000 draws are used for burn-in. Subsequently, 500 draws are used for posterior inference. These
represent the last draw of chains counting 500 draws each. This solution, instead of thinning from the same
chain, is well suited for parallel computing, a strategy that is adopted here, since every chain can be sent to
a different worker. Convergence and autocorrelation diagnostics are satisﬁed.
As detailed above, the multi-country VAR model is put into action by adopting a hierarchical structure
in which the country-speciﬁc coefﬁcients are randomly drawn from a Normal distribution with a common
mean. This is typically referred as the ﬁrst stage of the hierarchy. The second stage consists of prior as-
sumptions about the distributions of the common mean and of the country-speciﬁc variances. For the former
we employ noninformative priors; the latter are estimated in an Empirical Bayes fashion.
The conditional posterior for n has a natural weighted average format where sample and prior informa-
tion receive weights proportional to their relative precision. Thus, the country model whose coefﬁcients are
more tightly estimated receives more weight relative to the prior as compared to the model where the coef-
ﬁcients are imprecisely estimated. The variance of country-speciﬁc coefﬁcients depends on how different
the estimated country-speciﬁc coefﬁcients are and on their precision. If they are different and the uncer-
tainty around the estimates is small, the variance in the second level of the hierarchy will be large indicating
signiﬁcant heterogeneity. Conversely, if country-speciﬁc coefﬁcients are similar, the variance in the second
level of the hierarchy will be smaller.
4 Data and model speciﬁcation
The data is available at the quarterly frequency. The full sample spans from 1991:Q1 up to 2012:Q4 for
all countries except Spain, Portugal and Greece for which we have to start in 1995:Q1 (Spain and Portu-
gal) and 2000:Q1 (Greece). Since our estimation approach does not allow for time varying coefﬁcients, but
breaks and parameter instability are possible with two decades or more of data, we also use ﬁfteen-years-
7long windows starting in 1991:Q1 and roll from one year to the next keeping the window size constant. This
results in a total of seven subsamples estimates1.
All real variables are expressed in per capita terms at constant 2005 prices and enter the VAR in logs. All
variables are in levels, except for the (CPI) inﬂation rate which is in ﬁrst differences. A constant and a
linear trend are added to the VAR. The level speciﬁcation is preferred since for some of the variables we are
interested in, like the unemployment rate, the level can bring valuable information on its own. Also, we do
not want to rule out cointegrating relations.
Regarding the VAR model speciﬁcation, there is little guidance on which data to include. As a gen-
eral principle, all series relevant for the phenomenon one wishes to describe should be considered. This
reduces the risk of leaving important information outside of the model. For example, as ﬁscal and monetary
policies operate in tango (Davig and Leeper 2011), VAR aiming at characterizing ﬁscal policy outcomes but
neglecting monetary variables are likely to provide distorted conclusions (Rossi and Zubairy 2011). More
generally, research based on factor models (Forni et al. 2012) and large VAR models (Banbura et al. 2010)
has shown that there is a value in endowing the econometrician with a large information set.
In practice, these recommendations often collide with the challenge of producing reliable parameters esti-
mates, or ﬁnding sensible identiﬁcation restrictions when the system is beyond minimal. As a result, the
literature has witnessed a fairly large range of VAR speciﬁcations to investigate the same phenomenon.
To avoid the arbitrariness of picking one, among other possible, set of variables and to gauge the reper-
cussions on the results from using models of different sizes, we run for each country in our sample a battery
of VAR models, from smaller to bigger, estimated by OLS2.
The small version features data on government expenditures, revenues and debt, the unemployment rate,
domestic output and the short term interest rate. Government expenditures are split into investment and
consumption. Given this paper’s focus on the labour market outcomes of ﬁscal policy, we also use data on
government expenditures for social beneﬁts (or social transfers in kind), which encompass several social
safety nets programs including unemployment beneﬁts. This system contains the minimal ingredients to
study the effects of ﬁscal shocks on the economy: the ﬁscal series and output allow to meaningfully identify
ﬁscal shocks controlling for the business cycle3; the level of debt accounts for the signiﬁcant country het-
erogeneity that characterizes our sample in this respect4; the short term interest rate proxies the monetary
1In the case of Greece, the estimation sample remains forcefully ﬁxed at 2000:Q1-2012:Q4 always. For Spain and Portugal, the
starting date of the window is kept ﬁxed at 1995:Q1 for the ﬁrst four runs.
2As argued in Section 3, these VARs are likely to be affected by many shortcomings given our set-up. For this reason, the
emphasis here is not on inference, but instead on the insights that can be gained from an exercise of this sort in terms of model
speciﬁcation. The implicit assumption is that, while inference changes depending on the methodology, the dynamic relationships
between variables captured by the system of VAR equations remain stable. The additional advantage is to work with a computa-
tionally lighter version of the model.
3For instance by adopting a Cholesky orthogonalization of the covariance matrix when government investment and consumption
are ordered ﬁrst in the VAR, or by imposing theory-based sign restrictions (see Blanchard and Perotti 2002; Canova and de Nicoló
2002)
4We do not allow for feedback from selected endogenous variables to the debt level. Research based on US data did not ﬁnd
remarkable differences for the dynamics of macroeconomic variables other than the debt itself (Favero and Giavazzi 2007). Using
8policy instrument5; ﬁnally, the unemployment rate is our variable of interest.
The intermediate VAR model further includes total wages, hours worked per employee, the participation
and inﬂation rates. Compared to the previous one, this version features a richer set of labour market indica-
tors, which can be useful to control for changes along the intensive (hours) or the extensive (participation)
margin, and in the elasticity between earnings and vacancies. It also allows for a trade-off between inﬂation
and the unemployment rate.
The large VAR has a richer description of the real and ﬁnancial sides of the economy. It includes private
consumption and investment in housing from the national account identity, as well as domestic banks credit
to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and the yield on 10-years government bonds6. The last two series have been on top
of the watch list of policymakers and professionals, especially for peripheral countries, since the onset of
the ﬁnancial crisis, when domestic credit conditions deteriorated markedly and doubts on the solvency of
national governments demanded higher returns for holding their debt. As ﬁscal policy instruments were
heavily called into question, through either automatic stabilizers or discretionary programs of stimulus ﬁrst
and austerity later, their interaction with the former becomes of particular interest in the last portion of the
sample.
The VAR also features four exogenous variables that are intended to control for developments in the US-
and EU-wide business cycle and monetary policy stance: the US and euro area output, and the t-bill and
Eonia interest rates. The lag length is set to one7.
Figure 1 displays the sequence of orthogonalized residuals for government consumption and investment
respectively, for each of the countries in our dataset: the green line corresponds to the small model, the
blue line to the medium and the red line to the large VAR model. The innovations for both government
consumption and investment appear to be broadly consistent across the three different models. Therefore, it
is unlikely that an econometrician running any of these would arrive at antithetical conclusions. There are,
however, a number of important qualiﬁcations to be made.
In Italy, the shocks to the government consumption equation in the small VAR look implausibly large com-
pared to those in the medium and large model. A rationale for the observed differences can be that the
small VAR misses some relevant information for the correct identiﬁcation of the innovations: lacking this
information, the ﬁscal residuals absorb spurious ﬂuctuations that are, instead, ﬁltered out in the two bigger
annual data from 1970, Nickel and Tudyka (2013) show that the level of debt matters for the effects of ﬁscal stimulus policies
in a group of European countries. Our sample is, however, much shorter and throughout this period no country experienced large
swings in its stock of debt. Also, interest rates have been converging along a downward trend and the monetization of debt through
inﬂation has not been an option during at least half of our sample period as the creation of money was centralized and separated from
national government authorities. In this scenario, it is unlikely that debt stabilization entered strongly in domestic policymakers’
preferences. Some of these conditions changed from 2008 onward. So, as a robustness exercise, we identify shocks imposing a
mean reverting process on the dynamics of debt.
5Since the onset of the monetary union, domestic rates behaved consistently with the centralized conduct of monetary policy by
the ECB. Therefore they can be used both before and after the adoption of the euro.
6Due to the short sample available for Greece, the large VAR runs into stability issues when estimated using OLS. To circumvent
this problem, instead of adding a third round of series, we substitute the latter to the set of labour market variables used in the
medium sized VAR model.
7This choice is sufﬁcient to whiten the residuals from autocorrelation.
9models. In Austria and Portugal, ﬂuctuations in both government consumption and investment innovations
from the small VAR are only mildly correlated to those in the other models; instead, they are characterized
by a large serial correlation with their own lags. Furthermore, inference based on distinct shocks’ sequences
can be difﬁcult to reconcile: for example, the unemployment IRFs to a government consumption shock in
Austria lie on the positive or negative quadrant, depending on whether they are constructed from the small
VAR model or the two bigger ones.
We therefore choose to leave the small VAR model aside, since these preliminary tests indicate that it may
sometimes produce results distant from those obtained from the two alternatives, and we will adopt the
medium model as our benchmark. In turn, we use the large VAR for robustness as in some countries its
ﬁscal innovations are systematically larger than the ones in the benchmark model. In this respect, the most
remarkable case is that of Greece. Here, a VAR with data on domestic credit conditions and credit spreads
delivers government consumption and investment innovations with a different time proﬁle and more am-
ple ﬂuctuations. It can also be seen that these become signiﬁcantly bigger from 2010 onward, when the
task-force composed by representatives from the European Union, the European Central Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund took ofﬁce to guide the country through a steadfast ﬁscal adjustment program.
Throughout the analysis, the system of equations characterizing our VAR, be it the benchmark or the
large one, is going to remain the same. This choice is consistent with the deﬁnition of the VAR model as a
self-contained system of endogenous equations, whereby dropping one or more series for the purpose of a
given exercise actually alters the deﬁnition of the stylized economy and impinges the theoretical foundations
for results’ comparability. One may argue that, as far as inference is not affected, these details can be over-
looked. However, Figure 2 shows that it is possible to run into cases conﬁrming our concerns. The green
line plots the innovations in the government investment equation obtained from the benchmark VAR model.
The blue line shows the same concept, but constructed from a VAR where the government investment series
is tossed, depending on the identiﬁed shock. The examples of Portugal and Spain are of particular interest
as they show not only that distortions can be large, but also of opposite sign: in one case the shocks are
overestimated, in the other underestimated. This makes it hard for the econometrician to simply guess the
direction along which the bias is active.
4.1 Identiﬁcation of the shocks
The shocks are identiﬁed using the sign restrictions approach proposed by Canova and de Nicoló (2002).
For each posterior draw k, the method is based upon drawing a random normal matrix with zero mean and
unit variance, performing a QR decomposition to obtain the matrix H such that HH0 = I and computing
Q(s;j;k)H = R(s;j;k), where Q is the impulse response matrix to shock s at horizon j produced by
a Cholesky decomposition of the residuals covariance matrix. If the rotated impulse response matrix R
satisﬁes the theoretical restrictions, the rotation is stored and the routine moves to the posterior draw that
follows, otherwise a new rotation is generated according to the steps outlined above. Therefore, the results
reﬂect both parameter and identiﬁcation uncertainty.
10The restrictions imposed to identify government spending shocks are standard and they involve a total of
four instantaneous sign restrictions: (i) government consumption, or investment, declines; (ii) government
revenues are non-positive; (iii) deﬁcit declines; (iv) output declines. We consider only contemporaneous
restrictions since theory typically provides robust restrictions for only a limited number of periods (Canova
and Paustian 2011).
When ﬁscal policy shocks are the object of interest, this approach avoids most of the shortcomings affecting
identiﬁcation schemes based on a triangular decomposition of the covariance matrix. In fact, since all
variables are endogenous, there is no need to impose exogeneity of some with respect to others. Also, the
identiﬁcation does not rely on time lags between approval and implementation of a policy decision, therefore
concerns related to the predictability of ﬁscal innovations are ruled out.
The output and unemployment multipliers on impact are computed as the change in either one or the
other series for a 1% change in government spending. The cumulative multipliers are constructed in a
similar way, except that the changes are summed over the impulse response function horizon, which is
sixteen quarters.
5 The results
5.1 Output multipliers
AsourVARincludesoutputamongtheobservables, itisstraightforwardtocomputeﬁscalmultipliersfor
government consumption and investment shocks. These are reproduced in Table 1. The average multiplier
for government consumption shocks is 0.23 and the results for individual countries range from 0.11 in Spain
to 0.69 in Italy. The high value observed in Italy is an exception, since multipliers are larger in northern
European countries than in the southern ones, a fact that can also be read as evidence that public spending
is managed more effectively in core than in peripheral Member States. Our results fall within, or close
to, the range that is usually considered reasonable for advanced economies, that is 0.3-1. For example,
Perotti (2005) using a constant parameter VAR ﬁnds an annualized government spending multiplier of
0.6 on impact for Germany. Cléaud et al. (2013) obtain an impact multiplier of 1.1 for France with a
time-varying structural VAR. Estimates produced for a number of individual European countries using the
European Commission Quest Model (ECQM) vary from a minimum of 0.4 for Netherlands to a maximum
of 0.7 for Portugal (see HM Treasury 2003).
Figure3collectsthedynamicsofdomesticoutputinresponsetoanegative1%governmentconsumptionand
investment shock. The impact responses are always signiﬁcant and negative. The largest effect is reached
on impact, with the only exceptions of output in response to government investment shocks in Austria, Italy
and Spain , where the dynamics are hump-shaped. Portugal displays very persistent output dynamics since
the IRFs’ value sixteen quarters after the shock is slightly below the value on impact.
A noteworthy remark is that output multipliers associated to government investment shocks are smaller
than the corresponding ones for government consumption shocks. This result is robust to the horizon over
11which multipliers are computed, in fact the only exceptions are the cumulative multipliers in the average
case and in Spain. Bermperoglou et al. (2013) ﬁnd the opposite result for Canada, Japan and the US. To
explain our ﬁndings it is important to consider the responses of other spending categories beyond the one
that is shocked. In the average case, after a negative 1% government consumption shock, both government
investment and government social beneﬁts fall by 0.2% on impact, and government social beneﬁts further
declines for three more quarters till it reaches a bottom of -0.4%. Instead, a government investment shock
induces a jump in both government consumption and social beneﬁts of only 0.06%, so approximately four
times smaller. The synchronization between spending in consumption and social beneﬁts can be especially
important when the latter represents a relevant portion of public spending. In our sample of countries the
share of government social beneﬁts over domestic output is 19% in Austria, 18% in France, 17% in Germany
and Italy, 13% in Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, 16% in Greece. These numbers are only slightly below
the share of government consumption over output, but signiﬁcantly above the share of investment which
is around 3%. In short, the strong conditional comovement of government investment and social beneﬁts
after a government consumption shock can help to explain the more contractionary effects on output; this
mechanism can be especially important in countries where social beneﬁts represent a signiﬁcant portion of
public spending.
5.2 The labour market outcomes
The average effects of contractionary government spending shocks on a set of labour market indicators
are displayed in Figure 4. A 1% cut in government consumption and investment increases the unemploy-
ment rate with a multiplier slightly larger than one on impact. However, the evidence for the consumption
shock is not statistically signiﬁcant and the unemployment rate response can be positive or negative with
almost equal probabilities. Conversely, the government investment shock signiﬁcantly raises the unemploy-
ment rate. In this latter case, the initial jump is persistent: the unemployment rate grows up to a maximum of
1.5% ten quarters ahead and remains approximately at that level thereafter. This is in contrast to the govern-
ment consumption shock, where the unemployment rate peaks on impact and smoothly returns to its steady
state level. The visual impression is conﬁrmed by the unemployment multipliers reported in Table 2. The
impact median multipliers are both greater than unity, with the one associated to government consumption
being approximately 13% larger than the government investment multiplier; conﬁdence intervals, however,
are much larger for the former. As far as the longer term effects of ﬁscal policy shocks on the unemployment
rate are concerned, the difference for the typical European country is striking: while the median estimate
does not exceed 2% in the case of government consumption cuts, it is eight times larger in the case of gov-
ernment investment shocks. Note that we do not observe such a large discrepancy in individual countries
results. Hence the exact ﬁgure may be overestimated as a result of pooling very heterogeneous countries
together. Nevertheless, the qualitative result holds: with the only exception of Germany and Portugal, it is
always the case that the cumulative multiplier for government investment shocks is larger than the corre-
sponding ﬁgure for government consumption.
12When a government consumption shock hits, the participation rate slowly but persistently declines, indicat-
ing that displaced workers exit the labour force. The observed medium-term fall in the participation rate
together with the initial positive jump in the unemployment rate lowers the employment to population ratio,
indicating that cuts to government consumption can be especially harmful for the labour market8. Instead,
the participation rate raises signiﬁcantly after a government investment shock, suggesting that displaced
workers do not leave the labour force and actively seek for jobs. This fact partly offsets the increase in the
unemployment rate and mitigates the negative consequences on the employment to population ratio. A pos-
sible explanation for the differences documented above is that government consumption ﬁnances workers
with low productivity who ﬁnd it difﬁcult to re-enter the labour force once laid off; to the contrary, govern-
ment investment cuts displace skilled workers who remain in the labour force.
Real wages always fall, a ﬁnding that is consistent with Pappa (2009) and other studies that employ VAR
techniques and consumption - instead of product - wages. It is also in line with the predictions of New
Keynesian models of the business cycle, and contrasts those obtained from neoclassical models where the
assumptions of perfect competition and diminishing returns to labour determine a short run fall in real wages
for any increase in the labour supply. The median decline after a government consumption shock is approxi-
mately three times as large compared to the one observed after an investment shock. Considering that a large
part of government consumption is absorbed by public employment, it is plausible that negative government
consumption shocks compress wages more than shocks to government investment.
The responses of hours per employee are small and not signiﬁcant, indicating that the extensive margin is
the main channel of adjustment to ﬁscal innovations in the ’typical’ European country.
Figure 5 plots the responses for the unemployment rate after a government consumption (top half) and
investment (bottom half) shock fro each of the countries in the sample. It appears clearly that the jump in
the unemployment rate is never signiﬁcant in the case of a government consumption shock, with the only
exception of Portugal; the converse is true when a government investment shock is considered, except for
France. The change in the unemployment rate is usually very persistent. These facts are in line with the
average results discussed above.
Country-speciﬁc responses show that there are qualitative differences in the dynamic behavior of the unem-
ployment rate in response to a government consumption shock. In fact, the median response is negative in
Austria and Netherlands, becomes negative after a few quarters in Spain, ﬂuctuates around zero in France
and is positive everywhere else. There are also remarkable quantitative differences: the impact response
goes from 4% in Germany to zero in France, from 5% in Portugal to 1% in Spain. Although these responses
are in the majority of cases not statistically signiﬁcant, they should not be overlooked by policymakers as
they point to non-negligible heterogeneity and to an ambiguous conclusion regarding the effects of spend-
ing cuts on the unemployment rate in euro area countries. A one-size-ﬁts-all approach to the planning and
8The employment to population ratio (EP) can be written as one minus the unemployment rate (UR) multiplied by the labour
force participation rate (LFPR), that is EP = (1   UR)  LFPR. When we construct a decomposition of the labour market
changes by taking differences of logs, we obtain log(EP) =  UR + log(LFPR), making use of the approximation that
the log of (1   UR) is equal to the negative of UR.
13conduct of ﬁscal policy at the European level is hardly the best option in such a scenario.
Unemployment rate responses after government investment shocks are more homogeneous across countries:
they are always positive and the median unemployment multiplier on impact varies within a relatively com-
pact range - zero is the lower bound and 2% is the upper bound, with the only exception of Spain where it
scores 5%. The more or less uniform effects that countries experience after such shocks may result from the
fact that, between spending on consumption and investment, it is the former that governments use to pursue
a variety of purposes, some of which driven exclusively by the political agenda and unrelated to budget ob-
jectives or the economic cycle, making it hard to pin down consistent conclusions when adopting statistical
approaches.
Figures 6-7 collect evidence on a number of labour market variables beyond the unemployment rate, for
all countries in our dataset and in response to both types of government spending shocks. Contrary to the
observed path in Greece, Italy and Spain, the participation rate increases after a government consumption
shock in Germany, Austria and Netherlands. The geographical dichotomy is pretty sharp and it is indica-
tive that cuts to public spending are more depressing in economies with more rigid labour markets, like
the Mediterranean ones. Movements in hours per employee are heterogeneous across countries, which may
explain the wide conﬁdence bands obtained on average and can be the outcome of different collective agree-
ments and levels of unionization in place in different countries. We ﬁnd that in response to government
consumption shocks, the jump in hours worked is signiﬁcant in Austria, France and Germany; but not sig-
niﬁcant and of one order of magnitude smaller in southern European countries, where employment contracts
are less ﬂexible.
5.3 Allocative effects across sectors
The allocation of government spending is usually directed to few sectors of activity where the govern-
ment is the largest buyer or the main provider of services. This raises a concern about whether the results
described in the previous paragraph are representative of the dynamics across sectors, or else aggregate
ﬁgures hide remarkable differences. Research based on US data has shown that government spending is
concentrated in a subset of industries within the manufacturing sector, implying that different industries
may respond differently to shocks (see Ramey and Shapiro 1998; Perotti 2008). Since public spending in
sectors like military, health-care and infrastructure serves similar scopes independently of the country, it is
reasonable to assume that these conclusions extend to other advanced economies beyond the US.
To shed some light in this direction we construct the IRFs of the employment rate by sector of activity
in each of the countries in our dataset and compare the latter with the country-speciﬁc IRFs obtained from
aggregate data. By so doing we can check how close the sectoral IRFs are compared to the aggregate: if
the distance is positive, then one concludes that the employment effects in a given sector are larger than the
responses obtained from aggregate data.
The focus on employment, beyond being consistent with the objective of the paper, is motivated by the fact
that employment numbers are the only labour market indicators available at the sectoral level for European
14countries. The sectors for which we have employment data are: (i) agriculture, forestry and ﬁshing; (ii)
industry (except construction); (iii) manufacturing; (iv) construction; (v) ﬁnancial and insurance; (vi) real
estate; (vii) public administration. The source is Eurostat, Quarterly National Accounts by 10 branches and
the time span of the data is as described in Section 4.
Employment is not among the observables used to estimate the VAR. However, we have the unemployment
rate (UR) and the participation rate (LFPR), we use the equivalence ER = (1   UR
100)LFPR to back out
the employment rate (ER). The sectoral IRFs are obtained, ﬁrst, by estimating a distributed lag model
yt = s
1xs
t + s
2xs
t 1 +  + s
nxs
t n (13)
where the dependent variable yt is the total employment rate and the explanatory variables xs are the con-
temporaneous and lagged values of employment rates by sector of activity s. We use a relatively large
number of lags, n = 20, because employment series are extremely persistent. We take the resulting coef-
ﬁcients as a reduced form representation of the relationship between employment in the aggregate and at
the sectoral level. Next, we use the estimated sectoral coefﬁcients to back out the sectoral impulse response
function according to the formula
irfs
t = 1irft + 2irft 1 (14)
where irfs
t denotes the sectoral impulse response function of the employment rate at time t, irft without
the sectoral subscript s identiﬁes the aggregate one and t = 2;:::;16 is the chosen length of the impulse
response interval. The coefﬁcient 1 is the average of the s for the ﬁrst ten periods, 2 for the last ten.
We experimented with alternatives, such as the sum or the median and splitting the time unevenly, but the
overall conclusions did not change. Finally, in (14) we use only one lag of the aggregate employment
impulse response to be in line with the formulation of the panel VAR used in estimation.
Tables 3-4 report the results for the government consumption and investment shocks respectively. The
top half of the table presents the distance between aggregate and sectoral IRFs on impact; the bottom half
shows the cumulative distance which is constructed as the sum of the distance at every t9.
There are differences across sectors, especially for shocks to government investment. Shocks in industry,
manufacturing and construction have a similar magnitude on impact with the only exceptions of the industry
sector in Netherlands and the manufacturing and construction sectors in France (see Table 4). However, the
dynamics are more heterogeneous. Government investment shocks in manufacturing die out more quickly
in France, Germany and Italy; this is the case also for the sectoral IRFs in the industry sector in France,
Germany, Netherlands and Italy; instead, the dynamics are more persistent in the construction sector in
Germany and Netherlands, but less in France. Similar patterns are observed in the public administration
sector: while the difference on impact is never signiﬁcant, cumulative distances are signiﬁcantly smaller in
Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Italy.
9From the numbers in the tables, one cannot distinguish whether the employment rate IRFs are positive or negative, but only
see if the sectoral IRFs are comparatively bigger or smaller than the aggregate IRFs. Positive numbers mean that the sectoral IRFs
react more, either more positively or more negatively. Negative numbers mean that the response of the sectoral IRFs is more muted.
15In general, sectoral heterogeneity is more common in core European countries: Italy is the only one in the
pool of peripheral economies to display signiﬁcant variations in the dynamics across sectors.
The agricultural, real estate and ﬁnancial sectors are the most idiosyncratic. Differences with respect to
aggregate IRFs are quantitatively large; occur both for government consumption and investment shocks
and last over all horizons; and are positive, indicating that the shocks take longer to vanish compared to the
aggregate case. This behavior is likely a consequence of the small share of employment represented by these
sectors (below 4%), which makes the dynamics look odd. In fact, the responses in the agricultural sector in
Greece, Portugal and Spain, countries having shares of agricultural employment well above the euro area
average, show no signiﬁcant sectoral heterogeneity. The tiny employment numbers of these sectors also
make the economic impact of such big differences negligible.
5.4 Spending reversals
Fiscal stimulus packages are, by their very nature, temporary. Once the welfare policy objectives have
been obtained or the economic fundamentals restored, government withdraw the spending increases and tax
rebates that were initially voted. Sometimes, expansionary ﬁscal measures are not only in place for a lim-
ited amount of time, but they are also undone at a later stage to meet binding ﬁscal constraints, like deﬁcit
rules and debt ceiling, or to fulﬁll the political agenda of the ruling party. For example, as discussed in the
introduction to this paper, a number of euro area countries initially reacted to the crisis by passing stimulus
packages, deploying automatic stabilizers and approving further selective discretionary easing. However,
most of these initiatives were abandoned when national budgets seemed to go off-the-cliff and governments
quickly turned to a conservative ﬁscal stance10.
Fiscal expansions with spending reversals are more cost effective, as the debt overhang is necessarily re-
duced (OECD 2009). Moreover, a credible commitment to compensate the increase in spending - or the
drop in revenues - can help to limit interest rates hikes and thus the cost of borrowing for countries starting
from high levels of debt.
If the budgetary implications of spending reversals are fairly straightforward, their real effects are more
uncertain. A major concern is whether the beneﬁcial effects of the ﬁscal stimulus are long-lasting, or else if
they vanish as soon as the stimulus is withdrawn and the reversal kicks-in.
To measure the success of spending reversals, we choose to track the performance of the unemployment
rate conditional upon two alternative spending plans. The baseline scenario involves a permanent increase
in government spending for four quarters. The magnitude of the jump is set to one standard deviation and
occurs on the last available observation of our sample, which coincides with 2012:Q4 for all countries. The
reversal scenario implies that the increase in government spending lasts only for two quarters and is followed
10Spending reversals can apply not only to selected policy initiatives, but more generally to positive government spending inno-
vations. Fitting a VAR model to US data, Corsetti et al. (2012) show that the trajectory of government spending after a shock falls
below zero from the twelfth quarter onward and interpret this pattern as evidence of debt-stabilizing spending reversals. We do not
observe any undershooting in our VAR, which may suggest that European countries did not systematically react to their debt levels,
or that they did not do so sufﬁciently strongly over the estimation period.
16by a decrease of identical magnitude. Conditional upon these two alternative cases, we forecast the value of
the unemployment rate using the estimated coefﬁcients from the VAR model (Blake and Mumtaz 2012). As
stimulus policies are usually aimed at stimulating domestic demand and initiating a virtuous cycle between
spending and production, the unemployment rate seems a natural benchmark to evaluate their success.
The results are reported in Table 5. The ﬁrst column to the left reports the observed value of the unem-
ployment rate on 2012:Q4 in each of the countries in our dataset. The remaining columns show the forecast
four quarters ahead under the baseline or the reversal scenario, for both an expansion in government con-
sumption and government investment.
The main point that comes out of the table is that ﬁscal expansions followed by spending reversals eliminate
most of the beneﬁts coming from the initial spending increase. This is especially clear when conditioning on
the path of government investment. Take the case of Germany. The forecasted value of the unemployment
rate drops by 53% after four quarters of higher government spending. If instead we allow for a reversal after
the second quarter, the median forecast at the end of the period is 7.2%, which means 33% higher than the
latest available observation. This outcome is also observed in Austria and Netherlands. In France, Italy and
Portugal the projected unemployment rate declines under both scenarios, but the difference is nonetheless
large.
When conditioning upon a path for government consumption the picture is less clear. Although the exact
ﬁgures differ, the same conclusions made above apply to Greece, Italy and Spain. The results for Austria and
Netherlands show a deterioration under the baseline and an improvement under the reversal. This is counter-
intuitive but consistent with the IRFs reported in Figure 5 showing that negative government consumption
shocks decrease the unemployment rate.
6 Conclusions
We present evidence on the effects of negative government spending shocks on the unemployment rate
and a number of additional labour market variables for a set of euro area countries. Government investment
shocks unambiguously raise the unemployment rate: the impact multiplier varies substantially depending on
the country, from a minimum of 0.14 in France to a maximum of 5.05 in Spain for our sample of countries;
the increase is statistically signiﬁcant and it is very persistent. The effects of government consumption
shocks on the unemployment rate are characterized by a lot of uncertainty, the dynamics are never signiﬁcant
except in Portugal, and in Austria and Netherlands the median impulse response is negative. Therefore, one
cannot rule out that cuts to government consumption actually reduce the unemployment rate, as is argued
in Bruckner and Pappa (2010) for a sample of OECD countries. The responses of hours per employee
are always small and sometimes not signiﬁcant, so the preferred channel of adjustment is the extensive
margin. When a government consumption shock hits, the participation rate increases in Germany, Austria
and Netherlands. This is in contrast to what we observe in Greece, Italy, Spain and in the average country
wheretheparticipationrateslowlybutpersistentlydeclines, indicatingthatdisplacedworkersremainoutside
17of the labour force. The geographical dichotomy is pretty sharp and it is indicative that cuts to government
consumption are more depressing in more subsidized economies like the peripheral Member States. Instead,
the participation rate raises after a government investment shock, which suggests that displaced workers do
not leave the labour force and actively seek for new jobs. This mechanism can partly offset the increase in
the unemployment rate and mitigate the negative consequences on the employment to population ratio.
Sectoral differences with respect to the response of the employment rate to shocks are limited to government
investment innovations and pertain to the dynamics after the shock rather than the magnitude of the jump
on impact. Sectoral heterogeneities are more common in core European countries, Italy being the only
peripheral country showing signiﬁcant variations in the dynamics across sectors.
Spending reversals are cost effective, but they may undo most of the beneﬁts of the initial ﬁscal expansion
in countries with more reactive labour markets.
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217 Tables and ﬁgures
Table 1: Output multipliers.
Impact Multiplier Cumulative Multiplier
G consumption G investment G consumption G investment
Average 0.23 0.05 0.25 0.55
(0.15,0.30) (0.02,0.08) (0.16,0.32) (0.59,0.51)
Austria 0.42 0.03 0.23 0.02
(0.28,0.53) (0.01,0.05) (0.08,0.38) (0.03,0.06)
France 0.58 0.10 0.44 0.09
(0.42,0.71) (0.04,0.14) (0.32,0.52) (0.02,0.14)
Germany 0.38 0.04 0.42 0.09
(0.25,0.56) (0.01,0.07) (0.22,0.55) (0.05,0.11)
Netherlands 0.22 0.04 0.24 0.11
(0.12,0.31) (0.01,0.07) (0.13,0.35) (0.07,0.14)
Greece 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.18
(0.13,0.24) (0.07,0.18) (0.08,0.28) (0.14,0.20)
Italy 0.69 0.05 0.53 0.13
(0.59,0.77) (0.02,0.10) (0.48,0.57) (0.08,0.19)
Portugal 0.13 0.05 0.22 0.10
(0.05,0.20) (0.02,0.07) (0.15,0.28) (0.07,0.12)
Spain 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.15
(0.04,0.21) (0.01,0.05) (0.16,0.22) (0.10,0.17)
Notes: Impact multipliers are constructed as the value at time zero of the output impulse response divided by the value at time
zero of the government spending shock. Cumulative multipliers are constructed as the sum over time of the value of the output
impulse response divided by the sum over time of the value of the government spending shock. In parenthesis are 68% posterior
credible intervals.Table 2: Unemployment multipliers.
Impact Multiplier Cumulative Multiplier
G consumption G investment G consumption G investment
Average 1.20 1.06 1.87 17.82
(-1.99,3.84) (0.11,1.99) (-4.87,9.15) (4.85,55.78)
Austria -1.01 0.30 -7.13 2.34
(-5.28,3.42) (-0.13,1.06) (-12.49,9.63) (0.76,4.39)
France 0.41 0.14 0.01 1.50
(-4.88,8.43) (-2.13,3.04) (-7.54,17.24) (-3.04,8.83)
Germany 3.85 0.81 7.51 2.71
(-0.06,7.55) (-0.02,1.46) (-0.55,21.46) (0.75,4.80)
Netherlands -2.24 0.54 -5.03 3.65
(-4.26,0.80) (-0.27,1.19) (-9.16,1.60) (1.07,6.69)
Greece 1.17 1.80 1.40 5.67
(-1.19,2.91) (-0.22,3.77) (-3.73,6.38) (0.86,12.36)
Italy 1.20 0.68 2.82 2.89
(-0.19,2.51) (-0.28,1.76) (-0.77,7.17) (0.30,6.39)
Portugal 5.26 1.34 7.90 3.53
(2.94,10.50) (0.20,2.52) (2.47,18.77) (0.99,7.07)
Spain 1.29 5.05 -3.99 8.52
(-7.52,11.91) (1.30,10.38) (-17.42,27.39) (2.65,20.86)
Notes: Impact multipliers are constructed as the value at time zero of the unemployment rate impulse response divided by the
value at time zero of the government spending shock. Cumulative multipliers are constructed as the sum over time of the value
of the unemployment rate impulse response divided by the sum over time of the value of the government spending shock. In
parenthesis are 68% posterior credible intervals.Table 3: Government consumption shock, employment rate by sector of activity: distance from aggregate.
Impact Distance
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Construction Financial Real estate Public administration
Austria 17.21* -4.86 -4.51 5.41 25.17* 79.43* -6.41*
France 1.58 2.55 4.77* 7.54* 10.89* 20.35* -0.90
Germany 13.15* -1.22 -1.13 1.68 5.74* 21.01* -1.37
Netherlands 1.60 -0.99 -0.68 1.08 3.75* 19.30* -1.16
Greece 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 0.75 15.76* -0.06
Italy 3.87* 0.62 0.67 -0.12 1.82 20.80* -0.08
Portugal 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.07 3.55 11.72* -0.67
Spain 2.07 -1.39 -1.16 -0.71 13.92* 33.08* -1.53
Cumulative Distance
Austria 144.17* -44.12 -40.20 46.52 229.31* 723.13* -57.22
France 0.78 36.84* 63.05* 48.45* 51.15 197.38* -16.10
Germany 81.72* -6.98 -6.52 10.37 38.36* 133.68* -8.32
Netherlands 30.88* -4.52 -3.13 12.58 36.48* 185.47* -11.10
Greece -1.37 -2.16 -0.92 2.82 43.28* 1190.42* -6.03
Italy 76.01* -18.68 -18.02 9.84 81.87* 756.42* -14.32
Portugal -2.19 -5.29 -5.00 -0.78 33.32 113.00* -4.26
Spain 23.94 -14.62 -12.27 -7.50 151.88* 357.72* -18.63
Notes: The impact distance is constructed as the difference between the sectoral and the median aggregate employment rate
IRFs to a government consumption shock in the ﬁrst quarter. The cumulative distance is constructed as the sum over sixteen
quarters of the difference between the sectoral and the median aggregate employment rate IRFs. Asterisks mean that the
difference is signiﬁcant at 68% level. Agriculture includes also forestry and ﬁshing; industry excludes construction; ﬁnancial
includes insurance.Table 4: Government investment shock, employment rate by sector of activity: distance from aggregate.
Impact Distance
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing Construction Financial Real estate Public administration
Austria 2.31* -0.04 -0.18 0.52 0.13 0.47 -0.23
France 0.77 1.36 2.46* 3.62* 4.89* 8.07* -0.30
Germany 3.97* -0.64 -0.58 0.54 0.48 4.89* -0.50
Netherlands -1.01* -1.10* -0.75 0.30 1.87* 9.92* -0.60
Greece -0.15 -0.01 0.07 0.29 0.85* 45.28* -0.33
Italy 3.44* -0.85 -0.83 0.36 2.78* 31.92* -0.56
Portugal 0.53 0.69 0.67 0.08 0.69 2.13 0.23
Spain 0.71 -1.02 -0.84 -0.52 8.11* 20.47* -0.17
Cumulative Distance
Austria 36.97* -7.11 -7.37 10.49 36.28* 114.85* -10.33*
France -2.39 -10.42* -14.47* -6.63* 10.85 84.73* -7.04
Germany 114.52* -12.87* -11.87* 14.94* 39.54* 170.74* -12.68*
Netherlands 18.23* -11.00* -7.54 12.14* 41.93* 215.82* -12.98*
Greece -1.02 -1.28 -0.44 2.07 26.62* 762.91* -4.01
Italy 48.21* -13.46* -12.94* 7.54 61.79* 516.89* -10.43*
Portugal -5.25 -11.04 -10.50 -1.59 55.90* 190.13* -6.30
Spain 15.60 -7.57 -6.40 -3.90 86.90* 200.09* -13.42
Notes: The impact distance is constructed as the difference between the sectoral and the median aggregate employment rate
IRFs to a government investment shock in the ﬁrst quarter. The cumulative distance is constructed as the sum over sixteen
quarters of the difference between the sectoral and the median aggregate employment rate IRFs. Asterisks mean that the
difference is signiﬁcant at 68% level. Agriculture includes also forestry and ﬁshing; industry excludes construction; ﬁnancial
includes insurance.Table 5: Conditional forecasts: unemployment rate.
Government Consumption Government Investment
2012:Q4 Baseline Reversal Baseline Reversal
Austria 4.57 9.31 -9.77 2.76 5.34
(3.02,16.30) (-23.96,3.05) (2.01,3.54) (3.50,7.35)
France 10.50 5.91 -2.71 3.51 5.59
(-1.56,13.37) (-21.15,17.01) (1.60,6.53) (-1.77,10.11)
Germany 5.40 -3.20 19.24 2.52 7.20
(-8.81,2.15) (7.41,31.93) (1.59,3.32) (5.07,9.42)
Netherlands 5.63 10.54 -11.81 1.66 9.13
(7.09,13.83) (-20.24,-2.39) (0.60,2.54) (6.57,11.74)
Greece 26.10 2.01 12.17 2.30 10.78
(-1.68,7.08) (-0.41,20.45) (-0.03,4.49) (5.39,17.82)
Italy 11.40 1.91 11.58 2.92 7.18
(-0.86,4.42) (4.26,19.38) (1.73,4.23) (4.59,10.28)
Portugal 17.03 -6.07 34.78 2.12 10.03
(-10.95,-2.38) (23.93,46.87) (1.05,3.09) (7.09,13.25)
Spain 26.13 7.20 -1.91 4.74 3.89
(-14.31,23.15) (-37.79,50.21) (-0.91,10.70) (-13.54,21.02)
Notes: Forecasts are conditional on an assumed path for government consumption or government investment. Under the
baseline scenario government consumption (or investment) grows by one standard deviation and remains ﬁxed at that value for
four quarters. Under the reversal scenario, the positive jump during the ﬁrst two quarters is followed by a reversal during the
last two quarters. The table shows the initial value of the unemployment rate observed in 2012:Q4 and the forecast at the end
of the fourth quarter for each case.Figure 1: Government consumption innovations across VARs of different size.
Notes: Green: small model; blue: medium model; red: large model.Figure 2: Government innovations in the "full" or "toss" benchmark VAR model.
Notes: Green: "full" VAR estimated with both government consumption and investment data; blue: "toss" VAR estimated
leaving out one series among government consumption and investment.Figure 3: Contractionary government spending shocks: country-speciﬁc output.
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Notes: Continuous line: median IRF; Dotted line: 68% conﬁdence bands.Figure 5: Contractionary government spending shocks: country-speciﬁc unemployment rate.
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Notes: Continuous line: median IRF; Dotted line: 68% conﬁdence bands.Figure 7: Contractionary government investment shocks: country-speciﬁc labour market variables.
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